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Abstract 
This article elaborates a new paradigm in the interpretation of  Qur’anic 
legal verses conducted by a Syrian thinker, Mohammad Shahrour. This study 
shows that, according to Shahrour, Islamic jurisprudence is not “‘ayniyya”, 
but “h} udūdiyya” since for him, all legal rules carried by the verses represent 
the limits of  Allah which people can behave. Sharī‘a h} udu>diyya proves that 
Shahrour’s approach to the Qur’anic legal verses can be characterized as an 
open-ended process of  socio-political and moral codes. Still holding on to the 
tool of  textual analysis but combining it with a new perspective, h} udu>diyya, 
Shahrour manages to be faithful to the text and at the same time, compatible 
with the ideas and values of  modernity and humanism. Elaborated by other 
theories from other disciplines, especially mathematics and physics, Shahrour 
provides six types of  limits which encapsulate all Shari>‘a cases‍equipped‍with‍
their characteristics, differentiations and implementations.
[Artikel ini menjelaskan paradigma baru dalam menafsirkan ayat-ayat 
hukum dalam al-Qur’an seperti diperkenalkan oleh seorang pemikir 
berkebangsaan Syria, Mohammad Shahrour. Artikel ini memperlihatkan 
bahwa, menurut Shahrour, ayat-ayat hukum dalam al-Qur’an itu tidak 
bersifat “‘ayniyya”, namun “h} udūdiyya” karena berfungsi untuk 
membatasi. Sharī‘a h} udu>diyya yang diperkenalkan Shahrour menjelaskan 
bahwa pendekatan terhadap ayat-ayat hukum dalam al-Qur’an  bersifat 
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terbuka. Dengan tetap berpijak pada pendekatan tekstual terhadap al-Qur’an 
sembari memperhatikan pandangan baru, h} udu>diyya, Shahrour berhasil 
mempertemukan teks al-Qur’an dengan ide-ide dan norma-norma modernitas 
dan humanisme. Dijelaskan melalui teori-teori yang berkembang di disiplin 
ilmu‍ lain,‍ utamanya‍matematika‍dan‍fisika,‍Shahrour‍memperkenalkan‍
enam tipe batasan Shari>‘a.]
Keywords: shari>‘a ‘ayniyya, shari>‘a h} udu>diyya, Islamic jurisprudence. 
A. Introduction 
Twentieth-century Muslim thinkers, according to David Johnston, 
have been characterized by a paradigm shift, especially where Islamic 
legal theory (us}‍u>l‍fiqh) is concerned, from the classical orthodox position 
based on consensus (ijma>‘) and analogical reasoning (qiya>s) to a position 
based on reason as a tool to discover the universal ideas behind the divine 
texts.1 In its application as a fresh tool to interpret the Qur’an, this new 
paradigm is often combined with the scholars’ particular backgrounds 
in the social or natural sciences. 
The emergence of  this new paradigm, together with the absence 
of  a single vision to the Qur’an and its exegetical method among 
orthodox Muslims, has led some modern Muslim thinkers to establish 
their own methods to enable the Islamic community to see modernity 
as an opportunity to create the egalitarian society evoked by the Qur’an. 
Mohammad Shahrour2 is such a modern Muslim thinker. He is a Syrian 
engineer who made a unique contribution to the reinterpretation of  the 
Qur’an and the Sunna in particular and to law as a comprehensive system 
in general. According to him, both the traditionalist who hold tightly to 
the literal meaning of  the Qur’an and consider all Islamic heritage (tura>th) 
as an absolute truth suitable for all believers in any time, and the secularist 
modernists who refuse all kind of  Islamic heritage including the Qur’an, 
have failed to provide solutions for the dilemma of  modernity faced by 
1 David Johnston, “A Turn in the Epistemology and Hermeneutics of  Twentieth 
Century Usul al-Fiqh”, Islamic Law and Society, Vol. 2 No. 2, 2004, p. 234.
2 Among many different of  his name, this spelling is preferred on the basis that 
Shahrour himself  transliterates his name in his way to non-Arabic audiences. However, 
other versions are maintained as they appear in cited material. 
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contemporary Muslims.3
This failure then led Shahrour to propose his own method as a 
third alternative by returning to the “al-Tanzīl” 4 (the Qur’an). Like other 
mufassirs, Shahrour strongly emphasizes that the Qur’an is God’s speech 
revealed to the prophet but addressed to people of  every generation. 
It is a “remembrance” (dhikr) which God has taken upon himself  to 
preserve. It means that every generation may interpret the Qur’an in a 
manner that makes it relevant to its circumstances and should not be 
bound by the interpretations of  previous generations. What Shahrour 
desires is to understand the Qur’an “as if  the Prophet has just died 
and had informed us of  this book” (ka’anna‍al-nabi‍tuwuffiya‍h}‍adīthan‍wa‍
ballaghana ha>dha’l-kita>b).5 
This also means Shahrour takes a position against the monopoly 
on Qur’anic interpretation by traditionalists (sala>f), which he regards as 
being corrupted by the “inherited ambiguous propositions” (al-musallama>t 
al-mawrūtha‍al-mushkila).6 Shahrour’s position against the “sacralization” 
of  previous religious knowledge, as Marcotte says,7 is supported by 
his proposition that the veracity (s}‍idq) of  the divine message is more 
important than the authentication (tas}‍dīq) of  sources based on human 
authority no matter who the author is.8 His rejection of  the traditional 
interpretation is due to the argument that it prevents anyone from drawing 
on techniques, methods, and approaches from non-Islamic sources that 
may bring a new insight to understanding the text, such as critical or 
hermeneutical approaches. 9
3 Mohammad Shahrour, Al-Kita>b wa’l-Qur’a>n: Qira>’a Mu‘a>s} ira (Damascus: Al-Aha>lī 
Ii al-T\aiba>‘a wa al-Nashr wa al-Tawzī‘,1990), p. 44.
4 This is typically his terminology to underline “the original text of  God’s 
revelation to the Prophet…” It is “a divine text whereas everything else is part of  the 
inherited legacy”. This is to ensure that all interpretations are no more than human 
understanding of  his divine text. See Shahrour, “The Divine Text and Pluralism in 
Muslim Societies, in www.19.org/english/articles/shahrour1.htm, p. 2.
5 Shahrour, Al-Kita>b wa’l-Qur’a>n, p. 44. 
6 Ibid., p. 47. 
7 Roxanne D. Marcotte, “Sahrur, the Status of  Women, and Polygamy in Islam”, 
Oriente Moderno, 20, 2001, p. 319. 
8 Mohammad Shahrour, Dira>sa>t‍ Isla>miyya‍Mu‘a>s}‍ira‍ fi‍ al-Dawla‍ wa’l-Mujtama>‘‍
(Damascus: Al-Aha>lī al-T|iba>‘a wa al-Nashr wa al-Tawzī‘, 1994), p. 37. 
9 Shahrour, Al-Kita>b wa’l-Qur’a>n, pp. 31-2.
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 Indeed his effort to combine this linguistic concept with the 
natural sciences, especially mathematics and physics, gave a unique 
contribution to the reinterpretation of  the Qur’an; that is what Hallaq 
has called a rationalistic perspective. It is rationalistic in the sense that it 
uses independent reason (‘aql), with the main aim of  proposing a modern 
epistemological system.10
The term sharī‘a‍h}‍udu>diyya itself  is actually adopted from the word 
“h}‍udūd” (limits), the plural form of  “h} add” found in the Qur’an in al-Nisa>’; 
13-14, dealing with inheritance, in which it appears in different wordings; 
“tilka‍hudūdulla>h” in al-Nisa>’; 13 and “wa‍man‍yata‘adda‍h}‍udūdahu” in al-
Nisa>’; 14. Based on the fact that the word “h}‍udūd” always appears in its 
plural form, Shahrour concludes that there is no single decree in Islamic 
law. It means there are many possibilities for the deduction of  rules from 
a particular legal verse on a specific topic. Furthermore, Qur’anic verses 
only establish upper and lower limits (hudūd) for human legal activities. 
Humans have a right to establish the appropriate rule within these limits 
based on their own circumstances. That’s why he considered the divine 
laws brought by Muhammad as sharī‘a‍h}‍udu>diyya (legislation based on the 
limits of  Allah), as opposed to sharī‘a‍‘ayniyya‍(legislation based on literal 
meaning of  verses), which was the character of  the previous divine laws 
brought by other messengers. 11
B. Mohammad Shahrour and the Problem of  Epistemology of  
Knowledge 
Mohammad Shahrour b. Dayb was born on April 11, 1938 in the 
Salihiyya quarter of  Damascus. He is the fifth child of  a dyer who had 
preferred to send him to state primary and secondary schools, rather 
than to the local kutta>b and madrasah in al-Midan, a southern suburb of  
Damascus.12 This account seems contradictory to Shahrour’s biographical 
sketch found in the last page of  the first edition of  his first book, Al-Kita>b 
10 Wael B.Hallaq, A‍History‍ of ‍ Islamic‍Legal‍ Theories (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), p. 248. 
11 Shahrour, Al-Kita>b wa’l-Qur’a>n, p. 579. 
12 This data is based on the interview conducted by Andreas Christmann with 
Shahrour himself  on May 2001. see Andreas Christmann, “The Form is Permanent, 
but the Content Moves The Qur’anic Text and its Interpretation(s) in Mohammad 
Shahrour’s ‘Al-Kitab wa’l Qur’an”’, Die Welt des Islams, No. 43, 2003, p. 145. 
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wa’l-Qur’a>n: Qira>’a Mu‘a>s} ira, because it is mentioned there that he studied 
at the Madrasa ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi for his ibtida>’iyya (primary), 
i‘da>diyya (preparatory), and thana>wiyya (secondary) degrees.13 In March 
1957 he was sent to Saratow, near Moscow, at the age of  nineteen, to 
study civil engineering. It was the beginning of  a process of  familiarization 
with Marxist ideas. He was challenged by Marxist dialectics, although he 
rejects being called a Marxist.14
Trained as a specialist in civil engineering, he received his Diploma 
in Civil Engineering in 1964 and then returned to Syria to teach at the 
University of  Damascus in 1967. He also performed research at Imperial 
College London. The “June War” between Syria and Israel in that year and 
the consequent break in diplomatic relations between Britain and Syria 
ended his research.15 One year later, in 1968, he was sent again to study 
abroad at al-Ja>mi‘a al-Qawmiyya al-Irlandiya (Irlandia National University) 
in Dublin for his Master’s and Doctoral’s degrees in soil mechanics and 
foundation engineering. Upon his return to Syria in 1972, he became 
a Professor in the faculty of  Civil Engineering (al-handasa al-madaniyya) 
at the University of  Damascus, from which he retired in 1999. While 
teaching at the university, in the same year, Shahrour, together with his 
colleagues, established a consultancy bureau in his field, namely Da>r al-
Istisha>ra>t al-Handasiyya in Damascus. From 1982-1983 he was sent by 
his institution to Saudi Arabia as an expert on engineering for another 
consultancy bureau.16 
Indeed, Shahrour never acquired a formal qualification or certificate 
in the Islamic sciences. Consequently, his knowledge in the diverse 
disciplines of  the Islamic sciences was obtained as an autodidact.17 This 
conclusion can be drawn from reports in his biographical notes about 
the process behind the publication of  his first book, Al-Kita>b wa’l-Qur’a>n: 
Qira>’a Mu‘a>s} ira. In his introduction to the book, Shahrour mentions that 
13 Shahrour, Al-Kita>b wa’l-Qur’a>n, the last page. 
14 Peter Clark, “The Shahrour Phenomenon: A Liberal Islamic Voice from Syria”, 
Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, Vol. 7, No. 3, 1996, p. 336.
15 Charles Kurzman (ed.), Islam Liberal: A Sourcebook (New York & London: 
Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 138.
16 Shahrour, Al-Kita>b wa’l-Qur’a>n, the last page. 
17 Christmann, “The Form is Permanent, but the Content Moves”, p. 145. 
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he spent all of  twenty years writing the book, divided into three phases.18 
In the first phase (1970-1980) he began to study the Islamic heritage 
(tura>th), hoping to find a solution to the political and intellectual crisis. To 
him, it was clear that after the death of  the Prophet, religious teachings 
had been manipulated by the wielders of  authority for political demands 
related to protecting power.19 
On the other hand, contemporary Islamic thought faced basic 
problems. Besides lacking an objective approach, especially in Qur’anic 
studies, it was also shackled by the traditions of  classical literatures. There 
are no ‘creative interaction’ with other (non Muslim) philosophies because 
of  the fear that these would taint Islamic teachings. Consequently, the 
religious interpretations recorded in works of  fiqh or tafsir were treated 
as primary sources and were regarded as sufficient to deal with any 
problem faced by Muslims, especially on the status of  women in Islam. 
Women are viewed one way in the Qur’an and another in the fiqh and 
tafsir books. The ‘Gate of  ‘ijtiha>d’ was closed and the character of  fiqh 
had henceforth been conservative, formalistic, obsessed with rules, out 
of  touch with contemporary thought, and concerned with the minutiae 
of  human relations rather than with wider social and political morality.20 
Finally, Shahrour was disappointed with what he called the madrasiyya 
mentality, which is expressed in the ancient school traditions (the 
Ash’arite, Mu’tazilite, and five schools of  law), that block the way to real 
solutions to the problems of  Muslims. As a result, he refused to follow 
a strict form of  salafiyya Islam as was the trend of  the time.
The second phase (1980-1986) was indeed the most important 
stage in the development of  Shahrour’s ideas since in this period he 
met Ja’far Dakk Albab, a Damascene Professor of  Literary Studies. 
They were companions when both of  them studied in Moscow in 
different departments, from 1958 till 1964. Albab introduced Shahrour to 
linguistics theories developed by ‘Abd al-Qahir al Jurjani, Al-Farra’, Abu 
‘Ali al-Farisi and Ibn Jinni, which then formed the basis for his approach 
to reinterpreting Qur’anic terminologies, such as al-Kita>b, al-Qur’a>n, al -
Furqa>n,‍al-Dhikr,‍umm‍al-Kita>b,‍lauh}‍mah}‍fu>z}‍,‍and‍al-ima>m‍al-mubīn. Together 
18 More detail in his Al-Kita>b wa’l-Qur’a>n, pp. 46-8.
19 “al-Us}‍ūliyya‍al-Isla>miyya…‍ila‍Ayna?”, in www.shahrour.org. 
20 Shahrour, Al-Kita>b wa’l-Qur’a>n, p. 586-8; and his Dira>sa>t Isla>miyya Mu‘a>s} ira, 
pp. 224-5. 
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with Albab, Shahrour elaborated on important issues from the Qur’an 
until 1986. The third phase (1986-1990) was the time for systematizing 
the ideas and preparing for publication.
As a newcomer to the field of  Islamic studies, Shahrour’s main 
medium for spreading his ideas was through publications. His first 
book Al-Kita>b wa’l-Qur’a>n: Qira>’a Mu‘a>s} ira was published in 1990. This 
822-page book is divided into two large sections; the first section is the 
theoretical part containing chapters explaining his elaboration of  basic 
principles and methods for interpreting the Qur’an, while the second 
part is more practical, containing a number of  chapters discussing the 
application of  the approach mentioned earlier in the book. It is clear 
from the book that, for Shahrour, the source of  human knowledge is 
objective reality provided by the world around men (anna mas} dar al-ma‘rifa 
al-insa>niyya huwa al-‘a>lam al-ma>ddy kha>rij al-dha>t al-insa>niyya).21 It means that 
the truthfulness of  opinions is not determined by human desires, but by 
their conformity to objective reality. Furthermore, based on al-Nah} l: 78, 
contemporary Islamic philosophy should be grounded on rationality as 
a result of  empirical inquiries in order to establish objective knowledge. 
Therefore, he denied all intuitive knowledge attributed to a possessor of  
illumination (ahl al-kashf).22
Nevertheless, Shahrour also believes that both visible and invisible 
worlds (‘a>lam al-shaha>da wa ‘a>lam al-ghayb) are real. While the visible world 
includes all material perceptible by human senses and reason as well, the 
invisible world, although also constituting a reality, has been imperceptible 
up to this time because of  the limitation of  human reason. However, 
Shahrour optimistically suggests that because of  the development of  
human reason, the invisible world will be uncovered. That is to say that 
Shahrour considers the matter as primary to the extent that it provides 
the basis for everything that exists. Because of  that, he insists that human 
reason is able to independently discover the truth and, consequently, that 
there is no contradiction between the Qur’an and philosophy as basis 
of  knowledge.23
Being one of  the important elements of  his thought, in the 
21 Shahrour, Al-Kita>b wa’l-Qur’a>n, p. 42.
22 Ibid., p. 43. 
23 Ibid.
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discussion of  qawa>‘id‍al-ta’wi>l, Shahrour draws explicitly two principles 
of  ta’wi>l.24 Firstly, revelation does not contradict reason, and secondly, 
revelation does not contradict reality. Therefore, the main aim of  ta’wi>l 
is to achieve perfect harmony between human sensory perception of  
the world and the content of  the Qur’an. Here, he proposes his concept 
of  “scientific background” (al-ard}‍iyya‍ al-ma‘rifiyya) as a prerequisite to 
performing ta’wi>l.25 Seventh-century Arabs had a limited conception 
of  the principles determining the natural world, but the history of  
scientific discovery has diminished what was unknown.26 These scientific 
discoveries inevitably provide much help in interpreting particular 
passages in the Qur’an.27 
Apart from that, Shahrour’s stress on natural law is evident when 
he dedicates the second chapter of  his Al-Kita>b wa’l-Qur’a>n, following 
the elaboration of  his linguistics concept, to a discussion of  the dialectic 
of  nature and human beings (jadal al-kawn wa’l-insa>n). For him, three are 
at least three principles at work in all kind of  matters. Firstly, there is 
inner contradiction in every single phenomenon in the world. Secondly, 
all things in the world are united and linked to one another. Thirdly, 
everything is an ongoing process and nothing is able to withstand eternally 
24 Unlike the Sunni mainstream view, which considers ta’wil as a metaphorical 
interpretation that displays the visible meaning (al-z} ahir), in contrast to tafsi>r, Shahrour 
defines it as an attempt to harmonize the absolute nature of  the Qur’anic verses with 
the relativity of  human understanding.
25 In order to understand this concept, one should begin with Shahrour’s 
interpretation of  “who are firmly grounded in knowledge” (al-ra>sikhūn‍fi’l-‘ilm) in Ali 
Imra>n: 7. First of  all, following Ibn Qutayba’s Qur’anic reading, he had preferred to pause 
in his reading after the word “al-ra>sikhūn‍fi’l-‘ilm”, rather than before it. Second, instead 
of  referring to the jurists (fuqaha>’) alone, he understands them in broader sense; they 
are collection of  all kinds of  intellectuals including philosophers, scientists, historians, 
physicists, each with their own scientific premises. This kind of  interpretation, for him, 
is supported by another verse, al-‘Ankabūt: 49, in which he interpreted “fi‍s\udūr‍alladhīna‍
ūtu’‍‍al-‘ilm” as ‘to the most eminent who are given knowledge’. Therefore, he includes 
al-Biruni, al-Hasan ibn al-Haytham, Ibn Rushd, Isaac Newton, Einstein, Charles Darwin, 
Kant, and Hegel. Shahrour, Al-Kita>b wa’l-Qur’a>n, p. 192-193.
26 Ibid., p. 44.
27 For example, Shahrour argues that modern theories of  the creation of  the 
world and the existence of  hydrogen are anticipated in the first three verses of  al-Fajr. 
Hūd: 7, then, explains that hydrogen is a compound that may become the visible object 
known as water. Ibid., p. 235.
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except the continuous process of  appearing and disappearing itself.28
It is all these kinds of  approaches that led al-Shawwaf  to conclude 
in his Taha>fut al-Qira>’a Mu‘a>s} ira that the influence of  Marxist thought in 
Shahrour’s thought is undeniable.29 This became more obvious from his 
educational background, which has already been discussed earlier. It is 
clear from his statement that he was fascinated by the Marxist dialectical 
approach and was challenged by Marxist dialectics. Furthermore, he also 
admitted that he owed much to Hegel and Alfred Whitehead as well.30
According to al-Shawwaf, materialism is an intrinsic characteristic 
emerging from Shahrour’s explanations. This is implied by his preference 
for the use of  the indefinite form of  “qira>’a” in the title of  his book “Al-
Kita>b wa’l-Qur’a>n: Qira>’a Mu‘a>s} ira”, which indicates that Shahrour considers 
his interpretation of  the Qur’an as one of  numerous interpretations 
developed by previous generations and further interpretations that will be 
introduced by generations after him. Just as the previous interpretations 
represented the reality and objective conditions of  the community at 
that time, his interpretation is representing the problems of  the current 
generation.31 That is to say that, according to Shahrour, a thought is a 
reflection of  reality.32
In other words, according to al-Shawwaf, Shahrour considers 
reality as the source of  thinking rather than the destination of  thinking. 
Reality is the foundation of  understanding Islam and not vice versa. It is 
the Qur’an which should be interpreted in accordance with reality and 
not reality that should be harmonized with Qur’anic teachings.33 It should 
be emphasized here that, according to al-Shawwaf, Shahrour utilizes the 
Marxist point of  view that the laws of  nature and society are objective, 
and it is impossible to change them arbitrarily. So it is necessary to act 
in accordance with objective laws to achieve a goal. “He who tries to go 
28 Ibid., pp. 119-120.
29 Munir Muhammad Tahir al-Shawwaf, Taha>fut al- Qira>’a Mu‘a>s} ira (Cyprus: 
Al-Shawwaf, 1993), pp. 29-41.
30 Clark, “The Shahrur Phenomenon”, p. 337; Kurzman (ed.), Islam Liberal, p. 
138.
31 al-Shawwaf, Taha>fut al- Qira>’a Mu‘a>s} ira, p. 30.
32 Shahrour, Al-Kita>b wa’l-Qur’a>n, p. 220.
33 al-Shawwaf, Taha>fut al- Qira>’a Mu‘a>s} ira, p. 30.
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against them inevitably meets with failure”.34
To conclude, Shahrour’s inclination toward objectivist theory is 
undisputable and led him to give the highest appreciation to human 
reason.35 This admiration equally directed him to the doctrine that nothing 
is good or bad but thinking makes it so.36 Another apparent character of  
his way of  thinking is his endorsement of  empiricism. By this view he 
believes that all knowledge is mainly based on or derived from experience. 
It means that the truthfulness of  opinions is not determined by human 
desires based on superstition and obscurantism but by their conformity 
to objective reality. According to him, contemporary Islamic philosophy 
should be grounded on rationality as a result of  empirical inquiries in 
order to establish objective knowledge. However, it doesn’t necessarily 
mean that Shahrour completely rejects rationalist theory. He clearly says 
that the mind may apprehend some truths directly without requiring 
the medium of  the senses, but this should be verified by reality in order 
to acquire the ultimate truth.37 It seems that he attempts to combine 
rationalism on one hand and empiricism on the other. On this basis, 
Eickelmann in one of  his articles, calls Shahrour the ‘Kant of  the Arab 
World.38
34 Spirkin, The‍Basic‍Principles‍ of ‍Dialectical‍ and‍Historical‍Materialism (Moscow: 
Progress Publishers, 1971), p. 47.
35 Such admiration is more prominently found in his second book, such as in 
his statement that we are obliged to use Allah’s gifts of  reflection (fikr) and power 
of  reasoning (‘aql), and that these gifts should be given total freedom in processes of  
analysis rather than memorization. Shahrour, Dira>sa>t Isla>miyya Mu‘a>s} ira, pp. 330, 319.
36 This can obviously be seen in Shahrour’s rejection of  the traditionalists’ 
understanding of  two principles in Islamic legal theories; they are “saddu al-dhara>’i‘ 
(blocking the means) and “dar’u‍al-mafa>sid‍ahammu‍min‍jalbi‘‍al-mana>fi‘ (prevention of  
corruption is more important than realizing welfare). The traditionalists’ concept of  
the former is inapplicable since it is based on estimations, not on actual conditions and 
real evidences (al-dala>’il al-ma>ddiyya al-burha>niyya). Just like the former, the latter principle 
is no longer relevant because, for him, those things considered as good resulting in 
welfare (masa>lih} ) or bad resulting in corruption (mafa>sid) are completely relative, and 
also need factual evidences. Shahrour gives as an example the prohibition for Muslim 
students to study in non-Muslim countries because of  fearfulness of  being intoxicated 
with practices which are unlawful in Islam. Shahrour, Al-Kita>b wa’l-Qur’a>n, pp. 583-585.
37 Shahrour, Al-Kita>b wa’l-Qur’a>n, p. 42.
38 Eickelmann, Dale F., “Islamic Religious Commentary and Lesson Circle: 
Is There a Copernican Revolution?” in G.W. Most (ed.), Commentaries-Kommentare 
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C. Prophethood and Messengerhood Verses: Another Concept of  
Al-Qur’an
The most striking of  Shahrour’s concepts is that he considers 
the term “al-Qur’a>n” to be different from “al-Kita>b”(the Book) and 
other terms which are conventionally understood as synonyms of  “al-
Qur’an” such as “al-Kita>b”, “al-Furqa>n”, and “al- Dhikr”. According to 
him, they have their own meanings. What is conventionally called al-
Mus} haf  al-Uthmany has been named by him as “al-Kita>b”, which then 
became a general term including the whole content of  the written copy 
(al-mus} h} af), beginning with al-Fa>tih} a and ending with al-Na>s. “Al-Kita>b” 
(in its definite form) is composed of  many different sections containing 
many different subjects revealed by God which are classified in many 
kita>bs (in its indefinite form), such as a book about the creation, a book 
about the Last Day, a book about religious observances (al-‘iba>da>t), and 
a book about social transactions (al-mu‘a>mala>t). Each of  these books is 
subdivided into other books, which are then subdivided into others. On 
the other hand, “al-Qur’a>n” is used by Shahrour as a specific term to 
identify one part of  al-Kita>b. God’s mention of  al-Qur’a>n and al-Kita>b in 
the one linguistic unit separated by a conjunction, for example, in al-H{ijr: 
1 shows that both of  them are different. Finally, Shahrour concludes that, 
in the Arabic language, the conjunction, besides functioning to link two 
or more different things, is also used to indicate that the second thing is 
less general than the first.39
Two other names for al-Qur’a>n, al-Furqa>n and al-Dhikr, are given 
new meanings that depart from conventional understanding. “Al-Furqa>n”, 
according to Shahrour, is distinguished on the grounds that it only 
comprises ethical teachings that standardize the minimal moral values 
a man should comply with in every day life. For him these teachings 
are equivalent to the Ten Commandments for the people of  Musa and 
‘Isa40, which are separate from their holy scriptures. Moreover, based 
(Gottingen: Vandenhoeck&Ruprecht, 1999), p. 140.
39 Shahrour, Al-Kita>b wa’l-Qur’a>n, p. 57.
40 This is based on al-An‘a>m: 151-153 which, according to him, speaks of  the ten 
moral teachings a Muslim should perform in daily life; they are: do not make associates 
of  Allah, be of  benefit to your parents, do not kill your children, do not engage in 
immoral acts, do not kill others without lawful reason, do not expend the property 
of  orphans unlawfully, do not falsify weights in transactions, speak justly, pay your 
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on al-Baqara: 53, A>li Imra>n: 3-4, and al-Anbiya>; 48, he concludes that 
al-Furqa>n constitutes a central character of  all divine religions and is a 
basic reference standard from which they might initiate discussions.41 
“Al-Dhikr”, on the other hand, is a specific term relating to Qur’anic 
revelation indicating an attribute of  the Qur’an as a phonetic or ‘uttered’ 
form of  al-Kita>b. Since the objective laws that structure the existence 
of  nature and human beings comprised by the Qur’an are, in principle, 
completely outside human senses, Allah transformed these into Arabic, 
a language spoken and understood by them. Here, again he emphasizes 
his endorsement of  the Mu’tazilite view on the creation of  the Qur’an.42
Shahrour begins to elaborate his concept by dividing all verses of  al-
Kita>b into two big groups; prophethood (al-nubuwwa) and messengerhood 
(al-risa>la), based on the status attached to the Prophet (see picture 1). 
While his prophethood represents the eternal and absolute side of  Allah’s 
revelation, his messengerhood represents its temporal and relative side. 
Again, this division is influenced by an epistemological framework that 
admits the objective reality (al-h}‍aqīqa‍ al-mawd}‍ū‘iyya) which is outside 
human consciousness. The sun, the death, the Last Day, and the Day 
of  Resurrection are an objective reality; their existence is a truth (h}‍aqq), 
there is no doubt about them. People can understand this reality only 
by objective scientific exploration applying scientific principles such as 
philosophy, cosmology, physics, chemistry, biology, and other natural 
sciences. On the other hand, there is the subjective reality (al-h}‍aqīqa‍al-
dha>tiyya) in which people can make a choice to do or not to do a particular 
activity.43 For example men can make a choice to perform or omit to 
pray, fast, perform the pilgrimage, to be of  benefit to parents, and else. 
Broadly speaking, the objective reality has to do with truth and falsity 
(h}‍aqq‍wa‍ba>t\il). It is al- Qur’a>n, whereas the subjective reality of  lawful and 
unlawful (h} ala>l wa h} ara>m);44 is umm al-Kita>b. (See Figure 1)
Shahrour then goes on to the second level of  his division of  
al-Kita>b based on the ambiguity and un-ambiguity of  the verses. This 
level is actually the continuation of  the first division. First of  all, the 
obligations, and follow the straight path. Ibid., p. 65.
41 Ibid., p. 66.
42 Ibid., pp. 62-63.
43 Ibid., pp. 103-105.
44 Ibid.,p. 55.
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Prophethood verses are subdivided into two groups; the ambiguous verses 
(‘aya>t mutasha>biha>t) and the verses that are neither definite nor ambiguous 
(‘aya>t la> muh} kama>t wa la> mutasha>biha>t). The ambiguous verses deal with 
objective realities; most pf  which are outside the human cognitive state.45 
These ambiguous verses are characterized by their form as reportage 
(khabariyya) as their main character; they do not deal with commands 
and prohibitions, but talk about heaven and hell, the resurrection and 
reckoning, general laws of  nature, and history.46 The second group, aya>t 
la> muh} kama>t wa la> mutasha>biha>t is derived from his interpretation of  the 
word “ukharu” in Ali ‘Imra>n: 7. The indefinite form of  this word gives 
rise to the group, which adds a third category to the conventional division 
between aya>t mutasha>biha>t and aya>t muh} kama>t 47. For Shahrour, it is this 
category intended by “Tafs}‍īl al-Kita>b” (the elucidation of  the Book) in 
Yūnus: 37, since these verses serve to explain al-Kita>b. Among the verses 
of  Tafs}‍īl‍al-Kita>b are Ali ‘Imra>n: 7, Hūd 1, and Fus} s} ila>t: 3. While Ali ‘Imra>n: 
7, according to Shahrour, justifies the above-mentioned three groups, 
Yūnus: 37 confirms that the Tafs}‍īl‍al-Kita>b is also revealed by Allah and 
does not derived from his Prophet.48
Following this, based on al-H{‍ijr: 87, Shahrour divides the ambiguous 
verses (aya>t mutasha>biha>t) into two groups: the glorious al-Qur’an (al-Qur’a>n 
al‍-‘Az}‍īm) and the Seven oft-Repeated (al-Sab‘ al-Matha>ni). It becomes clear 
then that, unlike the traditionalists, Shahrour considers al-Qur’a>n as a part 
45 Ibid., p. 56.
46 Shahrour, Dira>sa>t Isla>miyya Mu‘a>s} ira, p. 184.
47 Shahrour, Al-Kita>b wa’l-Qur’a>n, p. 55.
48 Ibid., p. 121.
Figure 1: The Division of  Qur’anic Verses ala Shahrour
The Book (Al-Kitāb) =
the Qur'an as conventionally understood
Prophethood (al-Nubuwwa) Messengerhood (al-Risāla)
Note: This picture is simplified version of  the chart presented by Shahrour 
at the beginning of  his first book.
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of  al- Kita>b. In relation to another type called the definite verses (‘aya>t 
muh} kama>t), he notes that al-Qur’a>n functions as their preserver (ha>fiz} ), 
supervisor (raqīb), and justifier (mus}‍addiq) since they are susceptible to 
falsification and imitation; therefore, the ambiguous and definite verses 
are not separated in al-Kita>b.49 Shahrour specifies smaller units of  al-Qur’a>n 
into five: the truth (al-h}‍aqq), general laws that coordinate existence (al-
qawa>nīn‍al-‘a>mma‍al-na>z}‍ima‍li’l-wujūd), laws of  history (qawa>nīn‍al-ta>rīkh), 
laws of  nature’s particles (qawa>nīn‍juz‘iyya>t‍al-t\a>bi‘a), and organization of  
nature’s phenomena (tas}‍rīf ‍ah}‍da>th‍al-t\a>bi‘a).50
Since al-Qur’a>n contains ambiguous verses, it represents objective 
realities outside human consciousness; therefore al-h}‍aqq‍wa’l-ba>t\il‍prevails. 
The verses are absolute, general, eternal, and unaltered since the creation 
of  the world; therefore they are stored in the lauh} mah} fu>z} , and revealed 
to the Prophet after being transmitted into Arabic. This position, like 
Christmann says, shows that Shahrour wants to stand between the 
Ash’arite and Mu’tazilite schools by proposing that there is only one 
part of  the whole al-Kita>b which represents the lauh} mah} fu>z} ,. On the 
one hand, unlike the Ash’arites who believe that all of  the Qur’anic 
verses are uncreated, absolute, eternal, and stored in the lauh} mah} fu>z} }, 
since they are his attributes,51 he believes that it is only the verses in 
the part designated as al-Qur’a>n which human beings are unable to fully 
understand in rational terms.52 On the other hand, at the same time, this 
view denies the Mu’tazilite’s claim for the created-ness of  all Qur’anic 
verses (see Figure 2).
Moreover, the revelation of  verses of  al-Qur’an was not historically 
conditioned and neither was it requested;53 therefore, it is impossible to 
49 Ibid., pp. 116, 160.
50 Ibid., p. 17.
51 Abu Zayd, Nasr Hamid, “Divine Attributes in the Qur’an” in John Cooper 
(ed.), Islam and Modernity: Muslim Intellectual Respond (New York: I.B. Tauris, 1998), p. 194.
52 Christmann, “The Form is Permanent, but the Content Moves”, p. 163.
53 Shahrour considers two types of  Qur’anic revelation. The first type is 
the revelation of  al-Qur’a>n, which contains the ambiguous verses of  Muhammad’s 
prophethood. The second is the revelation of  the umm al-Kita>b, which contains the 
definite verses of  Muhammad’s messengerhood, together with the Tafs}‍īl‍al-Kita>b and 
al-Sab‘ al-Matha>ni. Whereas the first type is revealed from the lauh} mah} fu>z} transformed 
into Arabic and then transmitted to the Prophet, the second is revealed from God to 
Muhammad’s heart without any intermediary.
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establish their asba>b‍al-nuzūl and no possibility of  identifying whether they 
are part of  those that are abrogating (na>sikh) or abrogated (mansūkh).54 
That is to say that such a dichotomy between universality and historicity is 
also accentuated in Shahrour’s method to redefine revelation. Besides that, 
Shahrour also wants to say that, with those kinds of  attributes, the verses 
of  al-Qur’a>n guarantee that all human beings from different historical 
and intellectual backgrounds will be able to link with the objective truth 
through applying ta’wi>l.55 Therefore, instead of  defining it as allegorical 
interpretation which ignores the apparent meaning (al-za>hir), he regards it 
as a process of  tasha>buh; it is an attempt to harmonize the absolute nature 
of  the Qur’anic verses with the relative understandings of  human beings.56
54 Shahrour, Al-Kita>b wa’l-Qur’a>n, p. 154.
55 It is in this point Shahrour articulates the fundamental aspect of  the i‘ja>z of  
al-Qur’a>n. Instead of  regarding al-i‘ja>z as mere admiration for its linguistic and rhetorical 
style as well as its intellectual-moral aspects, he defines it as the Qur’an’s potential to 
allow a permanent assimilation (al-tasha>buh) between the temporal and eternal, relative 
and total, partial and absolute. Ibid, p. 60.
56 Ibid., p. 187.
Figure 2: The Division of  Qur’anic Verses based on their 
Equivocalness
The Book (Al-Kitāb) =
the Qur’an as conventionally understood
Prophethood (al-nubuwwa) Messengerhood (al-risāla)
Ambiguous Verses
(Ayāt‍Mutashābihāt)
Verses that are neither
Definite nor ambiguous 
(Ayāt‍lā‍Muh}‍kamāt‍wa‍lā Mutashābihāt)





of  the Book
(Tafs}‍īl‍al-Kitāb)
Note: This figure is a simplified version of  the chart presented by Shahrour 
at the beginning of  his first book.
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The next level of  Shahrour’s concept of  al-Kita>b is his elaboration 
of  the messengerhood verses. Since they deal with guidance for human 
attitudes and specific rules of  social behaviour (qawa>‘id‍al-sulūk‍al-insa>ni), 
the group contains only definite verses (aya>t muh} kama>t). These verses 
comprise legal prescriptions on religious services (al-iba>da>t), social 
transactions (al-mu‘a>mala>t), ethical values (al-akhla>q), and other religious 
instructions. This is what Shahrour calls the umm al-Kita>b57 which includes 
six types of  verses as follow: 1) the limits of  Allah, including the religious 
services (al-h}‍udūd‍bi‍ma>‍fīha> al -‘iba>da>t), 2) the general and specific guidance: 
the commandments (al-furqa>n‍al-‘a>mm‍wa‍al-kha>s:‍al-wasaya), 3) temporary 
legal prescriptions (ah} ka>m marh} aliyya), 4) conditional legal prescriptions 
(ah}‍ka>m‍z}‍arfiyya), 5) general instructions, but not legislation (ta‘līma>t‍‘a>mma, 
laysat‍ tashrī‘at), and 6) specific instructions, but not legislation (ta‘līma>t‍
kha>s}‍s}‍a,‍laysat‍tashrī‘a>t).58 (see Figure 3)
According to Shahrour, unlike those of  al-Qur’a>n, the verses of  
the umm al-Kita>b are not revealed from the lauh} mah} fu>z} }, but directly 
from Allah in response to the historical context in Mecca and Medina; 
therefore, their legal prescriptions are temporal. He insists the muh} kama>t 
verses in this part are not included in the eternally objective sources of  
existence (al-h}‍aqq) since they are not absolute and general, but relative 
and particular. Here, Shahrour does support the Mu’tazilites’ position 
that their verbal formulation and meaning are ‘created’ in the light of  
the historical context of  revelation.59
It is very explicit in Shahrour’s statements that the verses of  umm al-
kita>b are subject to alteration (tabdīl) and to independent reasoning (ijtiha>d) 
in order to be understood. Therefore, the exploration of  the occasions 
of  revelations (asba>b‍ al‍-nuzūl) and the verses which are abrogating 
(na>sikh) or abrogated (mansūkh) are very important information for a 
57 In his chapter on al-Fiqh‍al-Isla>mi> Shahrour elaborates that the term, “umm 
al-Kita>b”, is a specific name that could only mean the divine message brought by 
Muhammad because of  its character of  h} udu>diyya. This character makes it capable of  
being a source of  thousands of  possibilities for Islamic legal rules. Consequently, other 
divine massages bestowed on other prophets are only labelled as “Kita>b”, since they do 
not possess such a character. Ibid., p. 579.
58 Ibid., p. 17.
59 Abu Zayd, “Divine Attributes in the Qur’an”, p. 194.
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mujtahid.60 However, as Christmann says, through ijtiha>d, Shahrour always 
consultes the Qur’anic text directly rather than the asba>b‍al-‍nuzūl or naskh 
sources.61 Nevertheless, Shahrour’s understanding of  ijtiha>d is different 
from that of  many jurists. Instead of  defining ijtiha>d as an attempt to 
infer ah} ka>m from their sources and implement them to the particular 
needs of  contemporary societies,62 he puts it the other way around; it is 
the attempt to harmonize the temporal ah} ka>m with the eternally valid 
laws of  al-Qur’a>n. On this basis, Shahrour develops the principle of  the 
60 Shahrour, Al-Kita>b wa’l-Qur’a>n, p. 159-60.
61 Christmann, “The Form is Permanent, but the Content Moves”, p. 169.
62 Hashim Kamali, Principles of  Islamic Jurisprudence (Cambridge: Islamic Texts 
Society, 1991), p. 367.
Figure 3: The Complete Version of  Equivocalness-based Division of  
Qur’anic Verses
The Book (Al-Kitāb) =
the Qur’an as conventionally understood
Prophethood (al-nubuwwa) Messengerhood (al-risāla)
Ambiguous Verses
(Ayāt‍Mutashābihāt)



















The Mother of  
the Book
(Umm‍al-Kitāb)
Note: this figure is simplified version of  the chart presented by Shahrour at 
the beginning of  his first book.
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dialectics between straightness (al‍-istiqa>ma) and curvature (al-h}‍anīfiyya) 
in the development of  Islamic legislation, which then becomes the 
fundamental basis for what he calls sharī‘a‍h}‍udu>diyya.
D. Sharī‘a‍H{‍udu>diyya:	Islamic	Law	from	A	‘Scientific’	Approach
Shahrour’s principle of  the dialectics between straightness (al-
istiqa>ma) and curvature (al-h}‍anīfiyya) refers to al-An‘a>m: 79. He found that 
al-h}‍anīf (crookedness/curvature) is a fundamental character of  nature; 
the sun, the earth, and all other material beings (al-wujūd‍al-ma>ddy) possess 
this specific character. This is represented by motion, which is perceived 
not in a linear form, but rather in a non linear form. All things including 
the smallest electrons and colossal galaxies move in curves. “Al-dīn‍al-
h}‍anīf” is then defined as a religion with this kind of  character. Apart from 
this tendency in nature, curvature in law is characterized as a quality of  
non linear movement, in which customs, habits, and social traditions are 
different from one society to another and changes gradually even within 
a society. In order to control this change, people need God’s guidance to 
lead them to straightness. Consequently, the straightness is not a natural 
quality; rather it is a divine enactment intended to create a dialectic relation 
with the curvature. For him, this understanding is attested by al-Fa>tih} a: 
6 where, instead of  seeking curvature, which already exists in nature, 
people are represented as searching for straightness in their guidance.63
It can be seen clearly that Shahrour’s interpretation of  the word 
“al-h}‍anīf ”‍is contrary to that of  other exegetes, and, consequently, it has 
been subjected to many criticisms. In general, many challenge Shahrour’s 
understanding on the grounds that he ignores the contexts of  the verses 
in which the term is included. ‘Afana, for example, says that “al-h}‍anīfiyya” 
is a specific term only used in theological issues meaning confession 
of  the oneness of  Allah;64 any attempt to separate the term from this 
63 Shahrour, Al-Kita>b wa’l-Qur’a>n, p. 449.
64 Here, it seems that Shahrour tries to maintain the theological context of  the 
verse, but with different connotations. For him, Ibrahim was the first one to discover 
and believe in the special character of  nature; consequently he enjoys a special status 
before Allah among the other prophets. He believes that every existence is by nature 
crooked, non-linear, and changing except Allah. It means that considering any specific 
matter as perpetual and unchanging is regarded as creating another Supreme Being 
(shirk). Ibid., p. 577.
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theological context will result in a wrong understanding.65 Another writer, 
Mahir al -Munajjid, specifically discusses Shahrour’s interpretation on 
this term from both grammatical and etymological points of  view and 
concludes that it is fallacious and unacceptable. He rejects Shahrour’s 
dichotomy between this term and al-istiqa>ma, and instead considers that 
both of  them have the same meaning, namely is consistency, straightness, 
without crookedness, loyalty, and adherence to the religion of  Ibrahim.66
To put the above explanation in Shahrour’s epistemological 
framework, the straightness (al-istiqa>ma) represents the objective reality 
(al-h}‍aqīqa‍al-mawd}‍ū‘iyya), whereas the curvature (al-h}‍anīfiyya) represents the 
subjective reality (al-h}‍aqīqa‍al‍-dha>tiyya). The eternal and absolute character 
of  the straightness is guaranteed by its divine nature, and on the other 
hand, the relative and temporal character attached to the curvature is 
assured by human creativity in making choices between doing or omitting 
to do a particular activity. The dialectical relationship between these two 
in Islamic law, according to Shahrour, is inevitable because it indicates 
that Islamic law is adaptable to all times and places (s} a>lih} li kulli zama>n wa 
maka>n)67. Based on the al-Rūm: 30 law, he claims this adaptability could be 
guaranteed by the application of  his al-h}‍anīfiyya and al-istiqa>ma principle. 
It seems that Shahrour believes that his ‘unfamiliar’ principle is the right 
answer for the question of  adaptability, since part of  the verse explicitly 
enunciates that most people are not aware of  what it means. Moreover, 
the verse also implies that, being a straight religion (al-dīn‍al-qayyim), Islam 
has the same character of  strength and consistency as both human nature 
(fit\ra) and natural law as well.68
65 ‘Afana, Al-Qur’a>n wa Awha>m al-Qira>’a al-Mu‘a>s} ira (Amman: Dar al-Bashir, 
1994), p. 287. Other writers who share this criticism are Nash’at Zabyan, Dha>ka Raddun 
(Damascus: Dar Qutayba, 1992), pp. 77-78; Ahmad ‘Imran, Al-Qira>’a al-Mu‘a>s} ira li’l-
Qur’a>n‍fi’l-Mīza>n (Beirut: Dar al-Nafa’is 1995), pp. 112-113; al-Shawwaf, Tahafut al-Qira’a 
al-Mu’asira, p. 538.
66 Mahir al-Munajjid, Al-Ishka>liyya‍ al-Manha>jiyya‍ fī’l-Kita>b‍ wa’l-Qur’a>n;‍Dira>sa‍
Naqdiyya (Damascus: Dar al-Fikr, 1994), p. 157.
67 Shahrour, Al-Kita>b wa’l-Qur’a>n, p. 451.
68 Here Shahrour lists a number of  those natural consistencies as follows: (1) 
The highest mountain in the world is Mount Everest in Himalaya while the lowest place 
in the world is the bottom of  the Dead Sea, and most people live in places between the 
two. (2) The longest day in Damascus in one year is 14 hours and 26 minutes, while 
the shortest is 9 hours and 50 minutes, and the rest of  the days range between the 
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The dialectical relation of  the straightness and the curvature, 
together with his finding about the consistency of  human nature and 
natural laws led him to conclude that Islamic jurisprudence (sharī‘a) is 
not “‘ayniyya”, but “h} udu>diyya” since, for him, all legal rules carried by the 
verses of  umm al-Kita>b represent the limits of  Allah within which people 
can behave. That is to say that what are meant by the traditionalists as 
divine laws are actually boundaries, maximum or minimum, fixed by Allah 
within which people may operate in accordance with the Qur’an and the 
sunnah. It is the responsibility of  a mujtahid to determine to what extent 
they will apply a particular rule from the texts according to objective 
conditions available in their specific place and time.69
Shahrour, then, proposes an approach toward the interpretation 
of  legal verses called sharī‘a‍h}‍udu>diyya. Unlike the traditionalists, Shahrour 
bases his approach on the basic assumption that Islamic law is adaptable to 
all times and places (s} a>lih} li kulli zama>n wa maka>n). From his interpretation 
of  al-Rūm: 30, he concludes that this adaptability will only be assured 
by understanding the dialectical relationship between the crookedness 
(al-h}‍anīfiyya) of  man, on the one hand, and the straightness (al-istiqa>ma) 
of  God’s law, on the other hand. According to Shahrour, just like the 
world and all nature, man is by nature crooked (not linear) and tends to 
two. (3) Man’s eyes can perceive only above red coloured light and under ultraviolet 
coloured light. (4) Man’s ears can only sense frequencies between 20 and 20.000 hertz. 
(5) The normal amount of  glucose in the blood is between 70 and 120, and readings 
lower and higher than the limits will be considered abnormal and cause disruption. 
(6) The temperature of  a particular place always ranges between the highest and the 
lowest. (7) The human body needs a minimum amount of  water every day, while the 
maximum limit depends on the temperature and level of  thirst. (8) The lowest speed 
by which the human body can leave the earth is 7 km because of  gravity, while the 
highest is indefinite the point of  light acceleration is reached. (9) Nothing in the world 
can exceed light acceleration. (10) The minimum conditions for human beings to live 
are water and oxygen…. Ibid., pp. 575-77.
69 On this basis then Shahrour concluded his concept of  ijma>‘. Unlike the 
traditionalists who consider it as a consensus of  the opinions of  jurists (fuqaha>’), he 
regards it as a consensus of  a majority of  people represented by a consultative council 
where freedom of  thinking is assured and guaranteed. That is to say that rather than 
leave the authority of  legislation still in the hands of  the fuqaha>’, he removes it and 
relocates it under the authority of  the people. This is conceivable because, for him, in 
all matters dealing with social transactions (mu‘a>mala>t), every single action is basically 
permissible. Ibid., p. 582.
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deviate from the straight path or from linearity. Therefore, God sends 
down guidance that checks the crookedness and gives straightness to it; 
this guidance is God’s law.70 That is to say that what was understood by 
the traditionalists as divine law is actually boundaries, either maximum 
or minimum, fixed by God within which man may operate in accordance 
with the Qur’an and the Sunna. The word “h}‍udūd” (literally: limits) 
then became a fundamental keyword for achieving understanding of  
Shahrour’s methodology of  Qur’anic legal interpretation. This theory 
was articulated in his first book under title al-‍H{udūd‍fi‍al-Tashrī‘‍wa’l-‘Iba>da 
(the limits of  legislation and worship).
Another key of  Shahrour’s sharī‘a‍ h}‍udu>diyya is his mathematical 
analysis (al-tah}‍līl‍al-riya>d}‍iy). His analysis is useful for illustrating how the 
two concepts of  al-h}‍anīfiyya and al-istiqa>ma are simultaneously interrelated 
through Isaac Newton’s function notation. The function is symbolized 
by formula Y=f(X) means each function, at least, has two axes and 
one starting point; abscissa (X) represents time or historical context, 
coordinate (Y) represents God’s law, and the starting point (0) symbolizes 
the beginning of  Muhammad’s mission(see picture 4).71 
Shahrour initiates to explain his concept by dividing the limits 
into the limits of  legislation (al-h}‍udūd‍fi‍al-tashrī‘) and the limits of  ritual 
performances (al-h}‍udūd‍fi‍al-‘iba>da>t).72 It is clear from the terms he uses 
that he differentiates between the domain of  religious observances in 
70 Ibid., p. 449.
71 Ibid., p. 452.
72 Ibid., p. 452-3.
Figure 4: The Diagram Function Notation ala Shahrour
Y (God’s law)
X (time or historical context)
Note: this diagram is taken from Shahrour’s first book.
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which the use of  reason is totally prohibited and the worldly domain 
(mu‘a>mala>t) in which the use of  reason is strongly endorsed. To be sure, 
Shahrour’s description of  the concept is more complicated where the 
former is concerned than the latter. However, in both domains, it is easy 
to observe the construction of  the concept from Hallaq’s definition as 
follows:
“it is the divine decree, expressed in the kitab and the Sunna, which 
sets a lower and an upper limit for all human actions; the Lower Limit 
represents the minimum action required by the law in particular case, and 
the Upper Limit the maximum. Just as nothing short of  the minimum 
is legally admissible, so nothing above the maximum may be deemed 
lawful.73 Once these limits are transcended, penalties become warrantable, 
in proportion to the violation committed”.74
Based on the above-mentioned mathematical analysis, Shahrour 
draws six types of  limits in the sharī‘a‍h}‍udu>diyya as follows:
1. The lower limit standing alone (h} a>la>t al-h} add al-adna>)
Included in this type are all legal verses which contain only one 
limit at the lower. Consequently, legal reasoning (ijtiha>d) could be applied 
towards legislating divine rules precisely on or above the limit declared 
by a particular verse; nothing short of  the limit is permitted, but it is 
possible to improve the limit. According to Shahrour, there are four cases 
that can be categorized in this type; they are: the prohibition on men 
marrying certain women in al-Nisa>’: 22-23, prohibition on consuming 
certain foods in al-Ma>’ida: 3, the matter of  debt in al‍-Baqara: 282-284, 
and women’s dress in al-Nūr. 31.75
In the first case, for example, Allah’s clear prohibition to men on 
marrying women who have blood relations with them (their mothers, 
daughters, sisters and their daughters, maternal and paternal aunts) is 
absolute, no one can reduce it. However, the list can be expanded by 
adding, for example, daughters of  maternal and paternal aunts who, based 
on medical research, may produce handicapped offspring if  marriage is 
73 This, actually, represents the theory in very broad terms, since one of  six types 
has a lower limit that can be exceeded.
74 Wael B. Hallaq, A‍History‍ of ‍ Islamic‍Legal‍Theories (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), p. 248.
75 Shahrour, Al-Kita>b wa’l-Qur’a>n, pp. 453-455.
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concluded. For the second case, Shahrour concluded that the prohibition 
is not as solid as that of  marriage since there is another verse that concerns 
exceptions, especially in emergency situations (d}‍arūrat) in al-An‘a>m: 145. 
It means the limit for foods can be violated as long as the violation is 
based on a situation of  emergency. 
2. The upper limit standing alone (h} a>la>t al-h} add al-a‘la>)
Like the first, included in this type are all legal verses which 
contain only one limit, but these deal with the upper limit. Therefore, 
legal reasoning (ijtiha>d) could be applied towards legislating divine rules 
precisely on or under the limit declared by a particular verse; nothing 
above the limit is permitted, but it is possible to mitigate the limit. Two 
cases that may be categorized in this type, according to Shahrour, are 
the amputation for thieves in al-Ma>’ida: 38 and the death penalty for 
murderers in Sūrat‍al-Isra>’ : 33 and al-Baqara: 178. For both cases Shahrour 
stipulated that the penalties are upper limits that may not be exceeded, and 
it is for mujtahid in every generation to define the nature and magnitude 
of  the theft and the murder that call for these maximum penalties. For 
example, stealing intelligence through espionage or embezzling money 
on the state level should not be considered common theft since national 
security and economic interests are at stake. Instead, resort may be had 
to other penalties in al-Ma>’ida: 33, including being killed, or crucified, 
or have hands and feet cut off  on alternate sides, or be expelled from 
the land. Here, Shahrour disagrees with An-Na’im who would drop the 
amputation stipulation as cruel and inhuman. Shahrour would retain it 
as maximum punishment applied proportionally.76 
3. The lower and upper limits joining together (h} a>la>t al-h} add al-adna> 
wa’l-a‘la> ma‘an).
This third type includes all legal verses which contain lower and 
upper limits. Consequently, legal reasoning (ijtiha>d) could be applied 
towards legislating divine rules above the lower limit and under the upper 
limits or precisely on both limits. Just as nothing short of  the limit is 
permitted, so also nothing above the upper limit is considered lawful. 
76 Sanusi, “Democracy, Human Rights and Islam: Theory, Epistemology and 
the Quest for Synthesis”, in www.nigerdeltaconqress.com/darticles// democracy_
human_rights_and_islam. html.
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Two cases that can be categorized in this type are inheritance in al-Nisa>’: 
11-13, 176 and polygamy in al-Nisa>’: 3. 
In his description of  the first case, Shahrour cited all verses 
relating to inheritance; among them are: al-Nisa>‘: 11-14. He argues that 
these verses bear the lower limit for women and the upper limit for men 
regardless of  the difference of  economical responsibility between the two. 
In the condition in which men are completely responsible, their share is 
twice as much as that of  a woman. Here, the lower limit for a woman is 
33,3 percent and the upper limit for a man is 66,6 percent of  the estate. 
If  the woman is given 40 percent and the man 60 percent, then both 
limits are not being violated, but if  the woman receives 25 percent and 
the man 75 then the limits are being exceeded. That is to say that, in any 
case, the woman’s share must not be less than 33,3 percent and the man’s 
share must not be more than 66,6 percent; the actual portions, then, are 
decided according to the objective conditions existing in a particular 
society at a particular time.77 Unlike the theft case, Shahrour’s conclusion 
that no choice should be entertained for punishment of  adultery is very 
questionable, especially from the human rights point of  view, but it shows 
the consistency of  his exclusive reliance on the Qur’anic text. On the other 
hand, it seems that Shahrour shares the traditionalists’ epistemological 
platform that it is only God who knows the objectives of  legislations 
and, consequently, to say a particular punishment is cruel or barbaric or 
inhuman is all human opinion.
4. Cases in which the upper and lower limits have the same meeting point 
(h} a>la>t al-h} add al-adna> wa’l-hadd al-a‘la> ‘ala> nuqta wa>h} ida).
This type is also called ha>lat‍al-mustaqīm‍(a straight position) or ha>lat 
al-tashriī‘‍al‍-‘ayniyya (where a particular rule is exactly proved by a certain 
verse) since it has only one meeting point representing the lower and 
upper limits. It simply means there is no ijtiha>d. The only legal verse in 
this type is al-Nūr: 2, about punishment for women and men guilty of  
adultery. Based on his interpretation on the word “ra’fa”78 as a keyword, 
77 A long and comprehensive explanation of  the Islamic inheritance à la Shahrour 
can be found in his fourth book. Shahrour, Nahw‍Usūl‍Jadīda‍li’l-Fiqh‍al-Islami:‍Fiqh‍al-
Mar’a (Damascus: Al-Aha>li li al-Tiba>‘a wa al-Nashr wa al-Tawzī‘, 2000), pp. 221-298.
78 The full sentence in which the word “ra’fa” attached is “let not compassion 
move you in their case, in a matter prescribed by Allah (wa la ta’khudhkum bi hima ra’fatan 
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Shahrour believes that a hundred lashes is the only punishment that can 
be imposed for adultery without any mitigation. Compared with the verse 
on punishment for theft, he concluded that the word “naka>lan” found 
in that verse instead of  “ra’fa” means the amputation is an upper limit 
that may not be exceeded.
5. Where there is an upper limit that may not be touched (h} a>la>t al-h} add al-
a‘la> bi khatt muqa>rib li mustaqi>m ay yaqtarib wa la> yumass).
This fifth type has a logical coherence with the fourth type; while 
the fourth type exclusively dealt with adultery, this type deals with sexual 
relations between men and women. In other words, since adultery has a 
fixed punishment, sexual relations between men and women is permitted 
as long as they are not committing adultery. That’s why, according to 
Shahrour, the redaction “wa‍la>‍taqrab‍al-zina>” and “wa‍la>‍taqrab‍al-fawa>khish” 
are used.
6. A positive upper limit that cannot be exceeded and a negative lower limit 
that can be exceeded (h} ala>t al-h} add al-a‘la> muji>b mughlaq la 
yaju>z taja>wuzuhu wa’l- hadd al-adna> sa>lib yaju>z taja>wuzuhu).
Included in this type are all legal verses on fiscal transactions such 
as al -Tawba: 60, al-Rūm: 39, al-Baqara: 275-278, and A>li ‘Imra>n: 130. The 
upper limit is represented by charging interest (riba >) and the lower limit 
represented by the payment of  alms-tax (zaka>t). The middle position 
between the two limits, equivalent to zero, is an interest-free loan (al-
qarda>‍al-h}‍asan). According to Shahrour, since the prohibition on interest 
is not definitive in Islam, all economic activities involving interest could 
be considered lawful as long as the interest does not exceed 100 percent 
of  the original loan. This percentage as the upper limit for interest 
chargeable on any fiscal transaction is based on A>li ‘Imra>n: 130.79 On the 
other hand, the payment of  alms-tax (zaka>t), amounts to 2,5 percent at 
minimum, as the lower limit for donations may be exceeded by giving 
charity whose amount is unfixed.
Besides the above-mentioned six types of  limits, Shahrour also 
fi‍dinillah”. This sentence, according to Shahrour, allows the conclusion that a hundred 
lashes is the upper limit and at the same time the lower limit. Shahrour, Al-Kita>b wa’l-
Qur’a>n, p. 463.
79 Ibid. p. 467.
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draws another set of  limits on ritual performances (‘iba>da>t) as follows. 
First of  all, in the Islamic prayer (s} ala>t), the five daily prayers are not 
explicitly mentioned as the lower limit for Muslims. However, from 
many verses dealing with prayers it is obvious that there are four types 
of  Islamic prayers.80 Second, in fasting, the lower limit is fasting during 
the ramadla>n. There is no upper limit and concession is due in certain 
conditions. Third, in the alms-tax (zaka>t), the lower limit, based on the 
Prophet’s decision, is 2,5 percent, and it is possible to exceed the limit 
through ijtiha>d. Fourth, in the pilgrimage (h} ajj), there is only one lower 
limit; it is once in a lifetime for a Muslim who is capable of  performing 
it. Furthermore, Shahrour suggests that ritual performance (al-‘iba>da>t) 
is a kind of  individual piety and has nothing to do with state, social, or 
economical matters.81
E. Conclusion 
Sharī‘a‍h}‍udu>diyya proves that Shahrour’s approach to the Qur’anic 
legal verses can be characterized as an open-ended process of  socio-
political and moral codes. Still holding on to the tool of  textual analysis 
but combining it with a new perspective, h} udu>diyya, it manages to be 
faithful to the text and, at the same time, compatible with the ideas and 
values of  modernity and humanism. Elaborated by other theories from 
other disciplines, especially mathematics and physics, it provides a more 
detailed mechanism for its implementation.
This study also shows that Shahrour’s admiration for the authority of  
human reason and his strong endorsement of  empiricism in interpreting 
the Qur’an are undeniable. His definition of  sharī‘a as “a humanist and 
civilized legislation that guarantees the limits of  Allah”82 inevitably has 
the result that products of  his legal reasoning are ideologically colored by 
liberal notions. Nevertheless, his acceptance of  the separation between 
80 The four types are: 1) the Jum‘at prayer in al-Jum‘at: 9; 2) the middle prayer 
(al-s} ala>t al-wust\a) in al-Baqara: 238; 3) the five-times prayers (al-s\alawa>t al -khams) in al-
Mu’minūn: 9 and al-Ma‘a>rij: 34; 4) the recommended prayers (al-nafl‍wa‍al-tat\awwu‘) in 
al-Furqa>n: 64. It seems that Shahrour considers the Jum‘at prayer as the most important 
in Islam and, consequently, rejects the five daily prayers as part of  Muslim obligations. 
Ibid., pp. 490-491.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid., p. 580.
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religion and politics also brings him to secularist ideas. This does not 
appear as a complete breaking with religion as a source of  legitimacy 
for social and political life, but rather as an attempt to provide a new 
interpretation of  Islam which is compatible with contemporary human 
needs.
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